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Abstract 
A noteworthy feature of international environmental discourse since the late-1980s has been the shift 
toward anticipatory policies. Precaution is the leading policy approach that has emerged to guide 
environmental decision-makers confronted with inadequate information. The "precautionary principle" has 
found expression in Australia in the 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, various 
Commonwealth environmental management strategies and a number of pieces of Commonwealth and 
State legislation. It also has been accepted tentatively by the courts as a factor which should be taken 
into account in appropriate circumstances. However, existing Australian environmental management 
approaches fail to advance precaution in a substantive manner. Most hope for the advancement of 
precaution has rested on its potential to be a mandatory consideration by ministerial authorities when 
exercising planning powers. However, courts have cast doubt on the legal status of the principle because 
of the typically weak formulations of it in legislation and policy documents. In this article, a method is 
suggested by which the principle could be integrated systematically in environmental planning so that it 
could be given effect in environmental management practice. The writer proposes that environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) Australia's foremost environmental protection regime should be modified to 
give effect to the precautionary principle. A three-step method by which this could be achieved is 
presented. First, the EIA trigger of environmental 'significance' must be broadened; second, uncertainties 
must be assessed; and third, environmental uncertainty must have greater influence in decision-making. 
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Environmental Impact Assessment and the Precautionary
Principle: Legislating Caution in Environmental Protection
Warwick Gullett*
A
noreworthY feature of international
environmental discourse since the late-1980s has
been the shift toward anticipatory policies.
Precaution is the leading policy approach that has
emerged to guide environmental decision-makers
confronted with inadequate information. The
"precautionary principle" has found expression in
Australia in the 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on
the Environment, various Commonwealth environmental
management strategies and a number of pieces of
Commonwealth and State legislation. It also has been
accepted tentatively by the courts as a factor which
should be taken into account in appropriate
circumstances. However, existing Australian
environmental management approaches fail to advance
precaution in a substantive manner. Most hope for the
advancement ofprecaution has rested on its potential to
be a mandatory consideration by ministerial authorities
when exercising planning powers. However, courts have
cast doubt on the legal status of the principle because of
. the typically weak formulations of it in legislation and
policy documents. In this article, a method is suggested
by which the principle could be integrated systematically
in environmental planning so that it could be given effect
in environmental management practice. The writer
proposes that environmental impact assessment (E1A) -
Australia s foremost environmental protf}ction regime -
should be modified to give effect to the precautionary
principle. A three-step method by which this could be
achieved is presented. First, the EIA trigger of
environmental 'significance.' must be broadened; second,
uncertainties must be assessed; and third, environmental




Recent international practice in environmental impact
assessment (EIA) has seen a shift in emphasis from its
forecasting and decision-making structure to its role
within the broader environmental management context
(Wood 1995, 1997). The theoretical context in which
EIA has been conducted in Australia since the
* Warwick Gullelt is with the Department of Geography
at the Australian National University.
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early-1990s has been defined largely - but weakly - by
the official goal of ecologically sustainable development
(ESD). The 1987 World Commission on Environment
and Development report Our Common Future, also
known as the Brundtland Report, was the first
significant document to identify the importance of EIA
as a tool by which environment and development
objectives could be integrated to achieve "sustainable
development". The Report noted the increasing number
of countries that require EIAs for major projects and
recommended that:
"A broader environmental assessment should be applied
not only to products and projects, but also to policies and
programmes, especially major macroeconomic, finance,
and sectoral policies that induce significant impacts on
the environment" (World Commission on Environment
and Development 1987: 222).
In Australia, some of the connections between EIA
and the ESD concept were identified in the 1991
Australian and New Zealand Environment and
Conservation Council (ANZECC) report A National
Approach to Environmental Impact Assessment in
Australia. In particular, the report noted that EIA can
assist in achieving ESD by promoting "caution in
dealing with environmental risk and irreversibility"
(ANZECC 1991: 4). The 1992 Intergovernmental
Agreement on the Environment (IGAE) was the first
national policy formally to detail and adopt the
concept of ESD. It provides some guidance for the
incorporation of ESD principles in EIA and sets out
nationally accepted principles of environmental
policy, including the precautionary pri';ciple.
Essential approaches for achieving ESD were outlined
in the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable
Development (Commonwealth of Australia 1992),
released later in 1992. These include t·he consideration
of national implications of local activities and taking
long-term rather than short-term views in
environmental decision-making. Some 70 of the
recommendations contained within the nine ESD
sectoral reports relate to EIA (Environment Protection
Agency 1994a: 4).
The Precautionary Principle
Under clause 3.5.1 of the IGAE, the Commonwealth,
States and Territories and the Australian Local
Government Association agreed that:
"Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty
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should not be used as a reason for postponing measures
to prevent environmental degradation."
This is the traditional formulation of the principle
closely resembling that contained in the 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development - which
embodies the notion that we should act cautiously when
confronted with uncertain environmental risks. However,
the IGAE expands upon this core requirement thus:
"In the application of the precautionary principle, public
and private decisions should be guided by:
(i) careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable,
serious or irreversible damage to the environment; and
(ii) an assessment of the risk-weighted consequences of
various options."
The principle is a relatively new - but commonsense -
approach to guide decision-makers confronted with
scientific uncertainty in environmental matters.
Although it has been widely adopted (most notably by
the 179 countries which signed the Rio Declaration), and
the gist of the principle is generally understood (that we
should proceed cautiously where there is reason to
believe harm may result from a proposed activity), there
remains considerable doubt and disagreement about its
actual content. This is largely due to the numerous
formulations of the principle and the often ambiguous
manner in which it is phrased. Yet the principle is now
entrenched in environmental planning - if only as a
guiding principle - and continues to be incorporated in
international legal instruments, national environmental
strategies and domestic legislation. In fact, there is much
support for the contention that the principle has
crystallised into a norm of customary international law
(Sands 1995; Mclntyre and Mosedale 1997). In
Australia, it has been judicially considered in a handful
of cases, most notably in a series of decisions of the New
South Wales Land and Environment Court, and, most
recently, by the Federal Court of Australia in the Friends
of Hinchinbrook (1997) case (discussed below) (Gullett
1997; Lyster 1997). Although the principle is legally
recognised, due to its weak incorporation in statutes and
policy documents, courts have been unable to hold that it
is a "relevant consideration" even where its use is most
appropriate. The principle awaits a sufficient legislative
mandate to ensure that it is applied in appropriate
circumstances.
EIA and Ecologically Sustainable
Development
In 1993, in response to the reports discussed above, the
Commonwealth Environment Protection Agency (EPA)
commenced a comprehensive review of the
Commonwealth EIA process. Public comment was
sought on the direction and scope of the review. The
three most common recommendations in the submissions
received were to integrate the goals and principles of
ESD in ElA, extend the powers of the Environment
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Minister, and to ensure the protection of the
environment. The review recognised the inability of the
present EIA process to enable the Commonwealth
government to give full effect to its responsibilities
under the IGAE. It canvassed numerous reform
proposals relating to jurisdictional, triggering and
procedural elements of the EIA process. However, the
primary recommendation was for EIA to support the
application of ESD principles (Environment Protection
Agency 1994b: 1.14).
There is consensus among environmental planners and
resource managers that EIA must reflect ESD principles
more closely. However, little has been done in a formal
capacity to effect this goal. It is evident that "ElA is a
major tool for promoting sustainability; however
promoting the practicable steps that should be taken
when applying the process to that end are not necessarily
clear" (Department of the Environment, Sport and
Territories 1997: 5). The question then is: how can these
practical steps be taken? A method for integrating the
precautionary principle, a key component of ESD, in
EIA is now presented. This paper focuses on the
Commonwealth process established by the Environment
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 (Cth)
[EPIPA). However, the following framework is
applicable to all legislative EIA processes, including
those established under the following statutes:
• Land (Planning and Environment) Act 1991 (ACT)
• Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
(NSW)
• Environmental Assessment Act 1982 (NT)
• Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act
1990 (Qld)
• Development Act 1993 (SA)
• Environmental Management and Pollution Control
Act 1994 (Tas)
• Environment Effects Act 1978 (Vie)
• Environment Protection Act 1986 (WA)
EIA and the Precautionary Principle
It has been argued elsewhere that the precautionary
principle is more than a nebulous idea; it is conceptually
clear and it has a minimum content which can be given
practical application (Gullet! 1997; Moffet 1997;
Deville and Harding 1997; Tickner 1998). However, to
date, the Australian approach for advancing precaution
in environmental management has been repeatedly to
espouse the principle as a guide for environmental
decision-making. It is the writer's contention that a key
way to give effect to the principle so that it influences
decisions and environmental management practice is to
integrate it legislatively in EIA regimes. This, as will be
shown, would be achieved most effectively by
incorporating the principle in substantive provisions of
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Figure 1. Measures required to integrate the precautionary principle in EIA
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The principle and EIA are complementary. They are both
means of informing decision-making and influencing
environmental outcomes. Also, EIAs themselves are
precautionary in a minimal sense because they are
predicated on addressing uncertainty about future
environmental effects (Cameron 1993: 36; see Stedman
and Hill 1992; Ebbesson 1996: 253; Lawrence 1997).
However, the two differ conceptually: EIA is a procedure
prior to decision-making and the principle is a policy, or
potentially a rule, to inform or govern decision-making.
Integrating the Principle in the EIA
Process
Giving full effect to the principle could not be achieved
simply by appending precautionary considerations to
existing EIA processes. More wide-ranging reform
options also need to be adopted. In particular, EIAs need
to be conducted more widely to encompass strategic
impact assessment and to embody cumulative impact
assessments in order that they reflect two key notions
inherent in the principle - awareness that the causes of
environmental harm are numerous and interrelated, and
that these causes may be spatially and or temporally
distant from their effects (see Harvey 1992, 1998;
Wright 1994; Brown and McDonald 1995; Deville and
Harding 1995; Court, Wright and Guthrie 1996; Marsden
1997). The landmark New Zealand Resource
Management Act 1991 could be used as a guide. The Act
provides for broad assessments integrated in the
planning system with the explicit objective of
sustainable management (Section 5(1); Montz and
Dixon 1993; Dixon and Fookes 1995). Leaving aside the
applicability of EIAs for policies (see Bailey and Renton
1997), plans and programs, effective integration of the
principle in current project-specific EIA would require
three principal reforms to existing processes. They
would need to ensure that:
I.EIAs are conducted where there is
uncertainty regarding environmental
impacts;
2. there is adequate assessment of
environmental uncertainties; and
3.environmental uncertainties are
given appropriate weight in final
decisions.
The methodology proposed for
integrating the principle in EIA is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Slep 1: Threshold for operalion
of EIA
The first step to integrate the principle
in EIA would be to amend the project
screening criteria to ensure that EIAs
are not limited to activities which will
affect the environment "to a
significant extent" (section 5 EPIPA).
The EIA process must also be
triggered where there is uncertainty
regarding environmental impacts2.
There has been much dissatisfaction
both in Australia and overseas with the
subjectivity and uncertainty inherent
in the popular EIA threshold of
'significant' environmental impact.
Although the parameters of
1. Most legislative inclusions of the principle are stated in permissive terms and or are contained in general object provisions. However, see the
proposed Massachusetts Precautionary Principle Act (1997) which states that state agencies "shall" apply the principle "when there are grounds for
concern that a procedure or development may contribute to the degradation of the air, land and water of the Commonwealth" (House Bill 3140, si)
(Tickner, 1998).
2. It is to be noted that the Administrative Procedures issued under the EPIPA allow for the application of the EIS process where the responsible
Minister is satisfied that this is desirable "in order to achieve the object of the Act" (cl 1.2.I(b». This provides grounds to argue that in some
circumstances significant uncertainty as to the impacts of an activity could trigger the process (Mossop 1997: 200).
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environmental uncertainty are similarly elusive, this
difficulty is not insurmountable and guidelines could be
prepared to render this threshold operable. In a 1996
report, the ANZECC stated that initiating a formal EIA
process may be justified if there is "a high level of
uncertainty or a large number of unknowns" (ANZECC
1996: 2). In a draft discussion paper entitled ESD in EIA,
the NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning
recommended that a full assessment of an activity should
be undertaken if there is insufficient information
available to predict whether there is likely to be
significant environmental effects (Department of Urban
Affairs and Planning 1995: 21). It is suggested that
legislative force should be given to a lower, although
similar, threshold in all Australian jurisdictions: EIAs
should be required where there is insufficient
information available to predict whether non-negligible
environmental harm may occur. This lower evidentiary
standard would reflect the principle in so far as it would
shift attention from the acceptability of the 'significance'
of the environmental impacts of a proposal to the
acceptability of the level of scientific uncertainty which
attaches to the predictions of the impacts. Uncertainty as
to whether a project warrants an EIA would be reduced if
a list of 'designated developments' is adopted to trigger
the process. This has been done, for example, in the NSW
and ACT processes and in Europe via the European
Union Directive on EIA.
Step 2: Content of EIA
The second step to integrate the principle in EIA would
be to ensure that there is assessment of the environmental
uncertainties involved in a proposal. There must be a
genuine attempt to anticipate and evaluate the level of
scientific uncertainty. Table I lists examples of
uncertainty in EIAs (see also De Jongh 1988; Glasson,
Therival and Chadwick 1994: 122-4; Lawrence 1997:
87-8). Lawrence notes that uncertainty in EIA also
relates to value judgments in decision areas and sums-up
rather well the notion that a broader approach to
scientific inquiry is required:
"A scientific, positivist approach will not be generally
appropriate for the trans-scientific, messy problems often
encountered in EIA. A less analytical, more holistic,
approach will be required. A new scientific paradigm,
which incorporates concepts such as complexity,
nonlinearity and emergence, is more appropriate"
(Lawrence 1997: 88).
Uncertainty involves more than the presence or absence
of 'objective' scientific knowledge; to a large degree it is
socially and politically constructed. It involves
approaches to information affected by, among other
things, taboo, distortion, irrelevance and confusion (see
Smithson 1989; Wynne 1992; Dovers and Gullett 1998).
Awareness of this phenomenon in EIAs, in addition to
more rigorous scientific inquiry tailored to measuring
areas of uncertainty at each stage of an EIA, would
enable much more comprehensive assessments of
environmental impacts ~ in particular, cumulative
impacts - than are currently undertaken. Determining
how to assess uncertainty is the current challenge. J
EIA content requirements in legislation and subordinate
legislation typically provide poor guidance regarding the
type of impacts which needs to be assessed. The level of
assessment required invariably is absent or
incomprehensive. The 1994 revisions to the regulations
issued under the Environmental Planning and
Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) provide a welcome and
much needed amplification of content requirements in
that State. They provide that an environmental impact
statement (EIS) "must" include an analysis of the "likely
impact on the environment" of the development or
activity, having regard to the nature and extent of the
proposal and any associated building or work and
rehabilitation measures to be undertaken (New South
Wales Parliament: 1994). These requirements are
amplified in s 82 to include, among other things,
consideration of long-term and cumulative
environmental effects (but apparently only in relation to
the locality rather than distant effects). There is,
however, no specific provision for consideration of
uncertainty. This is odd, considering that the regulations
also require that proposed developments be justified
having regard to the principles of ESD, which, of course,
include the precautionary principle. A shortcoming here
is that although an EIS must include ESD, a decision to
approve a proposal can be made without regard to ESD
principles because the decision is made under Parts 4 and
5 of the Act which do not mention ESD (Stein and
Mahony 1997). Notwithstanding the important inclusion
of more distant environmental effects, the focus here
remains on "likely" impacts. Further, the scoping phase
of EIAs tends to consist of relatively in·formal
consultative processes between government agencies and
proponents. This affords proponents the opportunity to
influence determinations of what impacts should be
assessed and the level of assessment necessary. This has
contributed to the content of EIAs varying considerably
both between and within jurisdictions.
In Victoria, the guidelines issued under the Environment
Effects Act 1978 go further than their NSW equivalent
and state that an environment effects statement (EES)
"should" include:
"predictions of significant environmental impacts of the
proposaL.and their consequences, direct and indirect,
short and long term and cumulative, with an estimation of
the amount of uncertainty involved" (emphasis added)
(Department of Planning and Development 1995; 7).
3. There are a number of approaches to informing policy and decisions in the face of uncertainty, including modified forms of risk assessment (see
Walker 1991; Dovers and Handmer 1995; Dovers, Norton and Handmer 1996).
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However, this provIsIon for the estimation of
uncertainty - the only such provision in Australian
jurisdictions - does not indicate the extent to which
uncertainty must be examined. In the normal course, this
would be determined by a Consultative Committee,
established to guide the scope and preparation of
assessments. However, in practice, proponents are
afforded much flexibility in their interpretation of the
guidelines. For example, the Victorian Point Lillias EES,
which examined the proposed relocation of the port and
chemical storage facility at Coode Island in Melbourne
to Point Lillias near Geelong, met the uncertainty
requirement perfunctorily. In relation to the most
controversial aspect of the proposal - the nature and
understanding of its effect on the Orange-bellied Parrot
(a species listed in the highest order of concern under the
Endangered Species Protection Act 1992 (Cth)) - only
four concessions concerning uncertainty were made.
There were short statements about unknown population
trends, uncertainty concerning the area of the species's
habitat potentially affected and other factors playing a
role in the response of the species, and poor
understanding relating to habitat preferences. The EES
noted, however, that data relied on made "no pretence
about presenting a complete picture. This would require
vastly more knowledge of at least species abundance and
key functional aspects of the ecosystems" (Department
of Planning and Development 1996: 7B: 85). Thus,
despite the requirement that uncertainty should be
covered in the EES, this was done in a poor manner, and,
due to the unenforceable nature of the guidelines, with
no opportunity for redress. Although an Independent
Panel was established to review the EES, the adequacy
of review was undermined by the abbreviated period
given to the panel to complete its report and by the fact
that its primary recommendation - that the proposal
should not be approved in the absence of a more detailed
assessment - was not accepted by the responsible
Minister (Department of Infrastructure 1996).
In June 1996, ANZECC published a report entitled
Guidelines and Criteria for Determining the Need for
and Level of Environment Impact Assessment in
Australia. The document provides a framework to guide
Table 1- Examples of uncertainty in EIA
(adapted from Department o[Urban Affain and Planning 1995: 12)
Pre-developmeot: Impact Impact mitigation Decision making: Monitoring:
identification and and rebabllitation:
nrN.iction:
Knowledge of pre- Impact prediction Method may be: Decision made Monitoring may be
proposal maybe: • unproven based on unsuccessful for
environment, • [undermined • inappropriate • biased or various reasons:
proposed because) • only partially partially • inappropriate
technology, impacts may be valid (although accurate method
community values ignored, missed, these do not infonnation • inadequate data
and needs may be: overestimated preclude the • insufficient (temporally or
• incorrect or mitigation or infonnation to spatially)
• partially correct underestimated rehabilitation understand the • lack of
• non-existent [or] not fully from being full costs and commitment
understood partially benefits ofthe • lack offunding
• [inaCCllnlle] successful) proposal
because of Application of
Existing situation incorrect or method can be
may therefore be poorly designed unsuccessful due to: Lack ofa feedback
misunderstood and modelling or • failure of loop may lead to
all later stages may predictive method continued
be jeopardised techniques (unproven, unsustainable
• based on inappropriate, practices
incorrect incorrectly
knowledge of appHed)
pro-proposal • lack of
situation appropriate
• flawed because training,
of lack of data, maintenance or
incorrect data or management
the use of poor • lack of feedback
quality data loop from
monitoring
• other factors ego
fire may follow
revelZetation
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decisions regarding whether a potentially significant
proposal requires an EIA and the level of assessment
necessary. It calls for statements in ElAs on the level of
confidence with which predictions of impacts are made
(see Table 2). The document is a crucial - although
partial - step forward for ensuring that EIA practitioners
are more critical of scientific evidence and are mindful
of the assumptions which inhere in scientific methods
and interpretations. These two concepts go to the core of
the precautionary principle.
During the EPA review of the EIA process, completed in
1994, it was recommended that the Commonwealth
Government adopt the process the US National
Environmental Policy Act 1969 (NEPA) utilises for
dealing with incomplete information and scientific
uncertainty (Environment Protection Agency 1994c:
109). Requirements for the content of EISs are stated
rather briefly in NEPA but are amplified by regulations
issued by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),
established by NEPA to oversee the implementation of
the Act. Like the Commonwealth Administrative
Procedures, the Victorian Guidelines and the NSW
Regulations, the CEQ regulations are not binding on the
courts, although the United States Supreme Court has
ruled that they should be given "substantial deference"
(Fitzgerald 1996: 441). The CEQ regulations provide,
among other things, that where there is incomplete or
unavailable scientific evidence, this should be disclosed.
Where the cost of obtaining such information is
exorbitant, the relevance of the information must be
stated. In particular, there is a requirement that impacts
which have been ascribed a low probability of
occurrence but which entail possible catastrophic
consequences must be considered if they are "within the
rule of reason" (that is, they have some scientific support
and are not based on pure conjecture) (Code of Federal
Regulations 40: §§ 1502.22, l508.i7). The CEQ has
stated that agencies cannot ignore "uncertain, but
probable" effects 'of their decisions (Fitzgerald 1996:
464). Further, the United States Court of Appeals ruled
in the Sierra Club (1985) case that indirect effects of a
project that are reasonably foreseeable must be assessed
comprehensively. However, Breyer J held (at 878) that
in preparing an EIS, an agency need not consider
impacts which are "highly speculative or indefinite." .
To enable EIA to embody the precautionary principle it
would be necessary to adopt some of the NEPA
requirements. It would be imperative to require
Table 2. Checklist for EIAs: confidence of prediction of impacts
(Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council 1996: 9)
(I) What level of knowledge do we have on the resilience of a given significant
ecosystem? Cover-
- adequacy ofbaseline date;
-level ofcertainty anached to any management or rehabilitation program;
and
- relevance ofcomparable situations.
(2) Is the proposal design and technology sufficiently detailed and understood
to
enable impacts to be established? Cover-
- previous experience with design;
- relevant models;
- degree of accuracy desired; and
- degree ofaccuracy achievable.
(3) Is the level and nature ofchange on the natural and human environment
sufficiently understood to allow the impacts of the proposal to be predicted
and managed. Cover-
- adequacy ofbaseline data.
(4) Is it practicable to monitor predicted effects? Cover-
- frequency and duration of monitoring;
- feedback loops; environmental management plans; and
- community involvement.
(5) Are present community values on land use and resource use likely to
change? Cover-
- sources ofvalues; and
- degree of stress and change likely in the community.
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proponents to obtain all available scientific evidence of
possible environmental harm of proposals. If insufficient
scientific information is available (where there is reason
to assume there may be non-negligible environmental
harm), that would be reason alone to use the principle to
refuse project approval or to require precautionary
action for certain aspects of the proposal. A constant
soUrce of criticism of EIAs is that the quality of
scientific analysis they contain is often poor. To give
effect to the essence of the principle - that there be a
shift in the 'burden of proof". proponents should be
required to establish that the uncertainties which attach
to the predicted environmental effects of proposals are
within predetermined precautionary 'acceptability'
criteria or 'margin-of-safety' standards. This burden
would be more onerous to discharge where there is
conflicting scientific evidence and may call for a sliding
scale of required proof according to the predicted
likelihood and severity of harm. It may be necessary - at
minimum - to require a developer or potential polluter
to establish that no safer way to conduct the activity is
possible (Tickner 1998). This could coincide with
measures to ensure that EIAs place greater attention on
the existence of alternatives. The focus of scientific
analysis in EIAs would change from the significance of
harm to the limits of scientific knowledge (Bates 1994).
This change would act as an incentive for proponents to
submit sound proposals in the first place. Articulation of
acceptability criteria is beyond the scope of this
discussion, but attention is drawn to Table 3, based on a
discussion paper prepared by the NSW Department of
Urban Affairs and Planning, as a useful early espousal of
such criteria, and Table 4, prepared by Tickner to guide
weight of evidence analysis and the amount of proof
needed for precautionary action (see also Deville and
Harding 1997).
Although the NSW Department of Urban Affairs and
Planning (1995: 11) has expressed the concern that the
level of uncertainty associated with the predictive
process in some NSW EISs has been disregarded or
concealed, few commentators would argue that
proponents consciously suppress damaging scientific
evidence when preparing EIAs. It has been suggested
that what is more likely is that proponents fail to seek
Table3. Factors to consider in deciding the acceptability of a proposal based on
the precautionary principle
(Department ofUrban Affairs and Planning 1995: 24)
In making decisions about the proposal-
• Have worst cases outcomes been considered in the estimates of environmental benefits and costs?
Err on the side ofcaution when predicting outromes.
• Have risks to social or ecological inregrity been identified? Have the scope and scale ofrisks been
assessed? Are all risks considered acceptable?
• Has a risk averse approach been adopted? .Has a safety margin been applied and best available
teelmology used? Can performance bonds or other incentive mechanisms be applied?
• Is there scientific uncertainty about the outromes? Peer review of scientific data should be
undertaken. If certainty is low, are the poterrtial impacts likely to be serious or ineversible? If so,
strong consideration should be given to other options.
• Is there information uncertainties about outcomes? Where gllpS appear, detamine their legitimacy.
(Does information exist and applicant has ignored or not known about it, or is it really a gap in
human knowledge?) Where knowledge does not exist has the worst-case scenario been
considered?
• Is there certainty that a represe2ltative range ofcommunity values have been considered? Is there
certainty that sectors of the community will not be adversely affected at the advantage of others?
Has a cautious approach been taken when considering the needs offuture generations?
• Have valuation methods been appropriately used in weighing up the costs and benefits? Has
scarcity been appropriately factored into valuation and assessment of resources proposals? Have
appropriate factors been considered when considering compensation for non-sustainable use of
renewable or resource rents and.royalties for the use ofnon-renewable resources?
• Can consent conditions provide for early-warning ofenvironmental degradation?
4. The principle is generally understood as shifting the burden of proof from environmentalists (that of proving that a development would cause
significant harm) to developers (to prove that it would not cause such harm) (see Gullett 1997: 59).
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out information. Walker (1994; 291) has lamented that
an EIA cannot offer a "dispassionate assessment" of a
proposal. A difficulty arises here in ensuring that EIAs
adequately cover uncertainty at each relevant stage of
the process. Time limits for preparing assessments may
need to be relaxed to ensure that adequate information is
obtained. This would be politically unpalatable due to
persistent industry pressure for speedier project-approval
processes. Yet, depending on the jurisdiction, this may
be a necessary trade-off to ensure that rigorous EIAs are
prepared. Also, an opening-up of review processes
would be required. Wood (1995) has noted that
independent EIA review, although contributing to
increased cost and delay, has produced good results in
Canada and The Netherlands. A sound approach would
be to have expert independent panels - perhaps modelled
on those in Victoria or Canada - to review EIAs and
summarise the magnitude of uncertainty involved and to
provide recommendations with respect to whether
projects should proceed, or under what circumstances
they would be acceptable. This conclusion would then be
forwarded to the responsible minister for the final
decision following the procedure outlined below.
Step 3: Substantive influence on
decision-making
The numerous calls in policy documents and academic
literature for ESD principles to be incorporated in EIA
have tended to focus on reforming EIA procedure and
have tended to neglect substantive outcomes of the
process. It is essential that ESD principles govern, or at
least heavily influence, decision-making related to the
approvals process for major developments. In relation to
the matter at hand. once uncertainty is explicitly taken
into account in environmental assessments, the next step
would be to ensure that proper consideration is given to
it in final decision-making. Simply addressing
uncertainty in an EIA will not necessarily lead to it
determining the final decision. A legal rule needs to be
Table 4. Proposed criteria for precautionary decision-making
(Tickner 1998)
Causal infc=>ce criteria
• Stre2lg1h ofevidence (experimental and observatioItal)
• Amount and consistency ofevidence across a wide range ofcircumstances
• Tanpotality ofeffect
• Coherence with existing knowledge
• Plausibility ofeffect
• Have all evidence and all plausible hypotheses been considered?
• Power ofstudy(ies) to detect an effect
• Is the evidence statistically significant or ofpublic health significance?
• Is there some presumption ofcausal relatedness based on previous experience which would lower
the evidentiaIy standard? (i.e., is there evidence from any other similar case that would lead one to
believe that a similar impact could be considered in the present case?)
• What is the adve<se effect being studied and is it the correct one?
Decision--stakes criteria
• Spatial scale ofcause and effect local-national-regional-intfmatioItal-global
• Magnitude ofpossible impacts (on both humans and natural systems)
• Temporal scale ofpotential impacts
timing (near, medium, long-term)
longevity (short, medium, long)
• ReversIbility (easily quickly reve<sed or expensivefnreversIble)
• Mensurability offacto" and processes (well-knownlignorant)
• Degree ofcomplexity and cormectivity
• Is the action robust to uncertainties (error friendly)?
• Do alternatives or measures exist to reduce or eliminate potential hann (ease ofprevention)?
• What is the tracI<Xlffbetween further study and potential impacts?
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formulated requiring the prohibition of an activity or the
implementation of other appropriate precautionary
measures where the threshold for application of the
principle is met. This would be the case unless there is
sufficient evidence that the level of uncertainty (where
outcomes cannot be given probability distributions)
involved, not merely risk (the amalgam of the probability
of an outcome and the seriousness of its consequences) is
acceptable (see Farrier 1995: 351). To improve
environmental management, EIA recommendations
should be highly persuasive. This would alter their
character from being merely a procedural step more to an
approvals process - although this approach is not
without its critics (Buckingham 1996). A potential
problem is that, if the EIA process were to become an
approvals process, there would he more· attempts by
proponents and governments to avoid the process
(Environment Protection Agency 1994c: 108). This
would mean that the initial discretion relating to whether
a proposal requires an EIA would need to be narrowed
and coupled with a stricter interpretation of triggering
elements (see Buckley 1991; Whitehouse 1993).
Confining final decision-making discretion on this basis
would improve the integrity of the process by ensuring that
decisions which conflict with precautionary
recommendations are based on pre-determined relevant
considerations. This should take the form of a legislative
presumption that the responsible Minister adopts the expert
recommendations contained in independent reviews of
ElAs. To ensure that ministerial discretion would not be
usurped, this presumption would be displaced if compelling
reasons are given as to why, in the instant case,
precautionary recommendations should not be followed.
This could be achieved in a manner similar to the 'bounded'
decision-making established in Canada under the
innovative Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 1995
(CEAA). The Act fetters the discretion of the responsible
authority (section 37(1)(b)) thus:
"[W]here, taking into account the implementation of any
mitigation measures that the responsible authority
considers appropriate, the project is likely to cause
significant adverse environmental effects that cannot be
justified in the circumstances, the responsible authority
shall not exercise any power or perform any duty or
function conferred on it or under any Act of Parliament
that would permit the project to be carried out in whole
or in part" (emphasis added).
The important aspect of this provision is that the project
cannot proceed once it is established that the project is
'likely' to cause significant adverse environmental
effects, unless the effects can be justified in the
circumstances. Such a conclusion can be overturned only
by Cabinet Order-in-Council. Previously, the
responsible authority had complete discretion regarding
whether to accept or implement environmental
assessment recommendations (Sadler 1995: 121).
However, the proposal submitted here goes further than
the CEAA in so far as a similar provision in Australian
ElA Acts could read:
"Where, taking into account the implementation of any
mitigation [eg precautionary] measures that the Minister
considers appropriate, the project is likely to cause
significant [or non-negligible] adverse environmental
effects o~ there is a non-negligible level of uncertainty as
to whether such effects may result, the Minister shall not
exercise any power or perform any duty or function
conferred on the Minister or under .any Act of Parliament
that would permit the project to be carried out in whole
or in part, unless the Minister provides compelling
reasons why this is inappropriate in the circumstances."
A separate provision would be needed to elucidate the
"compelling reasons" exception. It would list other
exigencies which, in particular circumstances, could
outweigh the uncertainty which attaches to a proposal.
This could include significant economic effects and any
adverse environmental effects that may occur if the
project does not proceed. However, the Minister must
demonstrate that he or she has taken into consideration
overarching ESD principles. Judicial review must be
made available to ensure the adequacy of reasons and to
ensure that there is not merely pro forma compliance
with other procedural requirementss. The ability of the
public to challenge a decision is essential because the
appropriate precautionary approach may conflict with
vested interests of the proponent or the government of
the day. The important point is that, once the threshold
for project denial is reached, the onus is placed on the
proponent, and in turn, the Minister, to justify the project
against precautionary criteria.
Although by allowing argument against the application
of the principle this procedure would in some cases
enable precautionary recommendations to be avoided,
the principle has never been considered to have
mandatory application in all situations. The approach
outlined here would ensure that uncertainty is expressly
taken into account and that the necessary balancing act
of environmental, economic and social issues is
undertaken not simply by considering available
scientific evidence but also by being critical of such
evidence and taking into account the absence of
scientific data - amounting to a fundamental
re-evaluation of how costs and benefits are estimated. It
would require (where appropriate) precautionary
measures to be taken unless there is sufficient evidence
5. Judicial review would not usurp ministerial discretion because the nature ofjudicial review is to ensure sound decision-making - not to implement
policy. See Raff (1996: 132) for a discussion on the beneficial nature of objector participation in the planning process. In the United States. it has been
held that an agency preparing an EIS must consider in "good faith" the environmental consequences of its activities and must not make arbitrary
decisions. This involves taking a "hard look" at the adverse environmental impacts (H?l1and 1985: 761; Raff 1997: 216). .
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to conclude that the benefits of proceeding with a
development proposal outweigh the uncertainty
involved. This would be a utilitarian incorporation of the
principle allowing environmental trade-offs for other
expected benefits in appropriate situations. This
approach would make EIA more ethical and far-sighted
and would facilitate the substantive behavioural change
necessary to achieve sustainability. EIA would become a
truly precautionary process. The need for the approach
presented above is demonstrated in the appendix by the
shortcomings in the approvals process for the Port
Hinchinbrook resort development in Queensland which
spurned the most recent Australian judicial consideration
of the principle.
Conclusion
EIA is arguably the most obvious vehicle for glvmg
effect to the principle. However, the necessary
procedural reform of the EIA process suggested above
cannot be allowed to overshadow the purpose of EIA -
that matters affecting the environment are fully
examined and taken into account in development
decision~making so that activities avoid or minimise
anticipated adverse environmental effects. It is vital that
parliament prescribes that the principle is given greater
weight in decision-making, for example, by giving it
presumptive application. In addition to advancing
precaution in both a practical and nonnative sense, EIA
would be given a more concrete conceptual foundation.
As we embrace ESD principles we need to take a more
holistic perspective and recognise the interlinked nature
of environmental processes and human activities. EIA is
a tool which assists us in determining the future
implications of our activities and the precautionary
principle enables us to consider carefully whether 'we
proceed with potentially risky endeavours in the face of
uncertainty. The Federal and State governments have the
opportunity to draw on the wealth of literature on ESD
and EIA generated in the last five years and undertake a
revision of EIA processes and enshrine the principle in
EIA legislation.
Postscript
At the time of writing (early-1998), the Commonwealth
government released its consultation paper on the reform
of Commonwealth environment legislation, a large-scale
review conducted over a period of two years
(Department of the Environment 1998). Of relevance to
the matters discussed above, the Commonwealth
government has proposed a new Environmental
Protection Act to replace the existing Environment
Protection (Impact ofProposals) Act 1974.
The review presented the Commonwealth government
with an excellent opportunity to entrench sustainability
concepts in its fresh legislation by mandating application
of principles of sustainable development in appropriate
circumstances. However, as far as the broad
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underpinnings of sustainable development go, the
proposal goes no further than expressly recognising the
precautionary principle and the principle of
intergenerational equity in the proposed Act. There is no
indication of exactly how these principles will be taken
into account in designing case-by-case ElAs or final
decision-making. The proposal does not provide a
mechanism to ensure that these principles are considered
and accorded appropriate weight in decisions made
under the Act. The proposed Act will "enable", rather
than mandate, consideration of "any relevant cumulative
and regional impacts of a proposal" (Department of the
Environment 1998: 14).
The proposal foreshadows that the trigger for a
Commonwealth EIA will be where there "may" be a
"significant" impact on a matter of "national
environmental significance". This last criterion is
expanded upon but it appears that an activity, the
environmental effects of which may cross a State border
(for example, by cumulative or other more distant
effects), but otherwise does not meet the test of "natiOlial
environmental significance", will not trigger the
process. In fact, the review reflects the 1990s trend of
the previous Labor and current Coalition
Commonwealth governments of minimising the ambit of
federal involvement in environmental matters by
increasing the role played by the States, in this case, by
confining matters which trigger the Commonwealth
process and promoting State EIA accreditation. At
present, there is little reason to be optimistic about
greater reliance being placed on the precautionary
principle at the Commonwealth level in the short-term.
Appendix: Port Hinchinbrook Resort
Development
Port Hinchinbrook, located in the Hinchinbrook Channel
in north Queensland adjacent to two World Heritage
areas, is one of the most controversial developments in
Australia in recent years. Although - remarkable in
itself - no Commonwealth EIA or equivalent
Queensland process was ever conducted, in June 1994,
the then Federal Environment Minister, Senator
Faulkner, commissioned a report into the impact of the
development on surrounding World Heritage areas. The
"Valentine Report" concluded that there was an
inadequate level of baseline data on which to consider
properly the development proposal and that there was "a
great deal of uncertainty" about the impacts of the
proposal. It recommended that considerable further
study be undertaken "to clarify ·the extent and
significance of the impacts should the proposal proceed"
(Valentine 1994: 3). However, the report was able to
conclude that the development was bound to lead to
"intractable" environmental problems.
The present Environment Minister, Senator Hill,
formally approved the development on 22 August 1996
by issuing consent orders under the World Heritage
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Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth) (World Heritage
Act). In granting approval, Senator Hill relied upon a
review of the Valentine Report commissioned by his
department which satisfied him that the development
could be carried out "in a manner which is consistent
with the protection, conservation and presentation of the
World Heritage values of the area and without causing
any significant damage to the immediate environment"
(Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories
1996). However, the support which the review gave to
Senator Hill's decision was tenuous and, in some aspects,
absent. Fifteen possible impacts on World Heritage
values had been documented and the report concluded
that in relation to some impacts there was insufficient
evidence to predict their effects.
A legal challenge to the validity of the Minister's consent
orders was instituted in December 1996 by the Friends of
Hinchinbrook Society (1997) in the Federal Court of
Australia (Flemming 1997; Lyster 1997). Of relevance to
the matter at hand, the applicant contended that in
exercising his powers to grant consent orders, the
Minister failed to apply the "precautionary principle"
and thus failed to take into account a relevant
consideration. With respect to the principle, Sackville J
noted (at 100) that it, as adopted by the IGAE, is not a
relevant consideration which the Minister is bound to
take into account in exercising the powers conferred by
the World Heritage ,4ct. His Honour noted that:
"[i]t may be that the 'commonsense principle' .. .is one to
which the Minister must have regard. But this would flow
from the proper construction of the relevant legislation
and of its scope and purpose, rather than the adoption by
representatives of Australian governments of policies and
objectives relevant to a national strategy on the
environment."
In Sackville J's opinion, to the extent that the' Minister
was required to take account of the need to exercise
caution with regard to scientific uncertainty, he did so.
The Minister had before him a "good deal of material
suggesting a 'cautious' approach to the exercise of
power." Although the Minister did not expressly refer to
the principle in his reasons to grant the consent orders,
"he took steps to put in place arrangements designed to
address the matters of concern identified in the scientific
reports" (at I0 I).
The case, which concerns only the lawful exercise of
Ministerial authority with respect to the World Heritage
Act, demonstrates the inability of the existing
development approvals process to require the Minister to
give appropriate weight to precautionary considerations
when considering to approve development projects.' The
need to reduce less important political considerations in
the decision-making process is underscored in this case
due to the considerable political machinations
surrounding the proposal which involved different
Federal governments and provoked State/Federal
tensions. If the EIA process advocated here had been
used, the assessment would have contained a much fuller
examination of the environmental uncertainties involved
than the less formal assessments which were prepared.
The level of uncertainty identified most likely would
have put an onus on the Minister to address the
relevance of the precautionary principle to the proposal
and to justify why certain precautionary measures
(principally, denying project approval or significant
project modifications) would not be taken. In the event
that he could not do so adequately, more precautionary
measures would need to be taken, possibly involving
refusing project approval, or at minimum, delaying the
decision to enable more information to be obtained. This
would have been a clearer and more systematic process
by which the principle would have been given express
consideration and appropriate weight in a situation in
which this clearly needed to be done.
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